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John M. Collins* and J. Mitchell Miller**
I. LIMITED SALES, EXCISE AND USE TAX
A. Application of Tax
N Bullock v. Cordovan Corp. I the Austin court of appeals held that the
distribution of a controlled circulation magazine to a select group of
readers constituted a taxable sale even though the readers paid no con-
sideration for the magazine. 2 The court noted that distribution of the maga-
zine satisfied both elements of a sale: transfer of possession and
consideration for the transfer. Further, section 151.005 of the Tax Code 3
does not require that the recipient of the property pay the consideration. 4
The court concluded that the advertisers had actually paid consideration for
the transfer of the magazine to the readers in the form of increased advertis-
ing rates.5 The court reasoned that the advertisers were not merely paying
to have their advertisements published; they were also paying an additional
amount for distribution of the magazine to this select group.6
In a case involving a similar principle the comptroller ruled that a transac-
tion was a taxable sale rather than a nontaxable repair service.7 In Hearing
*B.A., Duke University; J.D., University of Texas. Partner, Haynes and Boone, Dal-
las, Texas.
** B.A., Ohio State University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Associate, Haynes
and Boone, Dallas, Texas.
1. 697 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In this case the comp-
troller argued that the distribution of the magazine was not a sale because the taxpayer
claimed an exemption from the sales and use tax under § 151.302 of the Tax Code with respect
to its purchase of certain supplies, materials, and services in the physical preparation of the
publications. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.302 (Vernon Supp. 1987). The taxpayer ar-
gued that the purchase and use of these materials and services was exempt due to the later sale
of the magazine. The statute of limitations barred the comptroller's counterclaim for sales tax
on the "sale" of the publication. After this decision the comptroller adopted a rule which
imposes a sales tax on persons who advertise in controlled circulation magazines. See infra
notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
2. 697 S.W.2d at 435.
3. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.005 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
4. 697 S.W.2d at 435.
5. Id. The court noted that advertising rates for such controlled circulation publications
are much higher than for regular publications because of the promise that the magazine will be
delivered only to a specified category of readers.
6. The court also noted that courts in Ohio and New Jersey addressed this issue and
ruled that the advertisers had supplied consideration for distribution of a magazine. See Fair-
lawn Shopper, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 98 N.J. 64, 484 A.2d 659, 663 (1984); Pento
Publishing Co. v. Kosydar, 45 Ohio St. 2d 16, 340 N.E.2d 396, 398 (1976).
7. Comptroller Hearing No. 16,418 (Aug. 8, 1985).
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16,418 the taxpayer delivered a repaired piece of equipment to the customer
from the taxpayer's inventory in exchange for the customer's equipment.
The taxpayer based the customer's price on the actual cost of repairing the
customer's equipment, which the taxpayer then added to its inventory. The
taxpayer provided functional equipment to the customer immediately under
this system, rather than taking the customer's equipment, repairing it, and
then returning the equipment to the customer.8 The comptroller, however,
placed great emphasis on the source of the consideration for the repair, con-
cluding that the essence of the transaction was an exchange of a functional
piece of equipment from the taxpayer's inventory for the customer's defec-
tive equipment, with a price determined at a later date.9
In a second case concerning exclusion of charges from sales price, the
comptroller ruled that certain amounts qualified as charges for transporta-
tion of tangible personal property after the sale, and were therefore excluda-
ble under section 151.007(c)(7) of the Tax Code. 10 The taxpayer in this case
was a national retailer operating catalog and mail order facilities in Texas.
On its order forms the taxpayer included a charge for transportation and
handling costs based on the weight of the items shipped. I The tax division
argued that the taxpayer could not exclude the amounts shown as transpor-
tation charges from the sales price for tax purposes because such charges
were commingled with handling charges and could not be separately identi-
fied. The comptroller, however, ruled that all of the charges were in fact
transportation and delivery charges after the sale. The comptroller's ruling
in this case seems contrary to Hearing 15,628,12 in which the comptroller
held that certain handling services and charges had been included within
transportation charges. Such inclusions disqualified those transportation
charges from exclusion. The comptroller distinguished the two cases by not-
ing that the transportation charges in Hearing 15,628 were based upon the
price of the item, which he considered to be an addition to the sales price,
while charges based upon weight were more representative of a true trans-
portation or delivery charge. Although one can make a distinction between
the two cases, it is somewhat narrow, and the comptroller's position on
transportation and handling charges remains unclear. In addition the trans-
8. If the taxpayer had repaired the customer's equipment and returned it to the same
customer, that would clearly qualify as a repair service which is excluded from the definition of
sales price and sales receipts under TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.007(c)(8) (Vernon Supp.
1987).
9. Comptroller Hearing No. 16,418 (Aug. 8, 1985). The comptroller cited Calvert v.
Engineers & Fabricators, Inc., 440 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969, no writ); Comp-
troller Hearing No. 11,606 (1984); Comptroller Hearing No. 7827 (1977). In Hearing No.
16,418 the equipment being repaired was an oil field packer, which is used in the well bore of
oil and gas wells for completion. A packer is an important piece of equipment and customers
may be greatly inconvenienced by waiting for the repair of their own defective packers.
10. Comptroller Hearing No. 14,785 (Oct. 28, 1985) (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 151.007(c)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1987)).
11. The charges were also determined on the basis of the average cost of transporting
items from various locations around the country to their ultimate destinations.
12. Comptroller Hearing No. 15,628 (1985); see also Collins, Taxation, 1986 Annual Sur-
vey of Texas Law, 40 S.W. L.J. 697, 703 (discussing Hearing 15,628).
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portation charges excluded from sales receipts in this case included transpor-
tation from the taxpayer's warehouse to a retail location and the comptroller
has previously ruled that charges for transportation to a warehouse con-
trolled by the seller are charges for transportation prior to the sale, and
therefore not excludable. 13
In another decision the comptroller liberally applied the exclusion under
section 151.056(a) of the Tax Code' 4 for tangible personal property incorpo-
rated into real property by a contractor or repairman. 15 The taxpayer main-
tained that equipment installed on an air conditioning system to heighten
efficiency constituted a permanent improvement under a lump sum contract
for the equipment and installation of the equipment. 16 The comptroller
agreed that the property had become part of the building and permanently
affixed to the building.17 The comptroller held that the system itself was
clearly a fixture, and a permanent modification to the system must also be
considered a part of that system and hence an improvement to real prop-
erty. 8 Although the comptroller noted that the equipment could be re-
moved without damaging the realty, he considered the equipment's
enhancement of the older inefficient system compelling evidence of a perma-
nent modification.
In Hearing, 17,05619 the comptroller ruled that a drill bit manufacturer
who separately stated on invoices a charge for the drill bit and a "diamond
deposit" liable for sales tax on the combined amount, even though the pur-
chaser eventually returned the drill bit and received a partial refund based
upon the value of the diamonds at the time of return.20 The manufacturer
could have structured the transaction as a trade-in allowance, which would
permit a reduction in the sales price under section 151.007(c)(6). 2 1 Instead,
the manufacturer stated the original sales price separately from the deposit
and offered a later refund for credit or cash. This offer failed to qualify as a
refund under section 151.007(c)(2) 22 because the manufacturer did not re-
fund the total amount charged for the drill bit. The offer also failed to qual-
13. Comptroller Hearing No. 13,251, (Mar. 10,1983).
14. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.056(a) (Vernon 1982).
15. Comptroller Hearing No. 16,195 (Sept. 9, 1985).
16. Section 151.056(a) provides that a contractor or repairman is the consumer of tangible
personal property furnished by him and incorporated into the property of his customer if the
contract is for a lump sum price covering both the service and the property. TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 151.056(a) (Vernon 1982).
17. Rule 3.291 defines an improvement to real property that will qualify for treatment as a
lump sum contract under § 151.056(a) as a contract with the intended purpose of installing
property that becomes a part of a building; the property must not be so temporarily attached to
the realty that the property does not lose its identify as a particular piece of machinery, equip-
ment, or property; and the equipment must not be readily removable without substantial dam-
age to the unit or without destroying the intended usefulness of the realty. Texas Tax Rule
No. 3.291, [1 Tex.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) § 66-047, at 7261 (Nov. 10, 1986).
18. The comptroller also noted that the efficiency equipment was not likely to be removed
and moved to another building.
19. Comptroller Hearing No. 17,056 (1985).
20. Id.
21. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.007(c)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
22. Id. § 151.007(c)(2).
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ify under section 151.007(c)(6) because the property returned was not used
as a trade-in allowance in the sale of a taxable item.
B. Specific Exemptions
The Austin court of appeals in Direlco, Inc. v. Bullock 23 narrowly con-
strued the exemption from sales and use tax under article 20.04(R) 24 for the
sale of gas and electricity. The court held that Direlco was selling for com-
mercial use the gas and electricity used in buildings it owned and leased to
tenants. 25 Commercial use is defined in article 20.04(R)(3) as "use by per-
sons engaged in selling, warehousing or distributing a commodity or service,
either professional or personal."'26 Despite this broad definition of commer-
cial use, Direlco argued that its purchase of gas and electricity for its build-
ings was not a commercial use because leasing of commercial office space is
neither a commodity nor a personal or professional service. The comptroller
argued that a commodity is anything useful or valuable, and service means
the administering or supplying of a need to others, which would include the
leasing of commercial space. The court held that commercial use has two or
more meanings and is thus an ambiguous term.27 Since the comptroller ap-
plied a broad definition of commercial use for a substantial period of time
without contradiction by the state legislature, the court ruled that the legis-
lature should be treated as having approved the comptroller's long-standing
interpretation of the statute.28 As a result, the definition of commercial use
includes all areas of commerce except those specifically excluded by the
statute.29
In Hearing 15,80030 the comptroller took note of the present economic
conditions of the Texas oil and gas industry in ruling that drilling equipment
built for use outside Texas was exempt from sales tax even though it was
stored within the state for eighteen months after construction. Section
23. 711 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
24. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(R) (Vernon 1969) (now codified at TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 151.317 (Vernon 1982)).
25. 711 S.W.2d at 361. Direlco provided certain services to tenants, including the provi-
sion of gas and electricity, along with maintenance and security services. The statute generally
provided that gas and electricity were exempted from sales and use taxes except when sold for
commercial use. The language in § 151.317(A) of the Tax Code is essentially the same. See
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.317(a) (Vernon 1982).
26. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(R)(3) (Vernon 1969) now codified at TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 151.317(c)(2) (Vernon 1982)). The language in § 151.317(c)(2) of the Tax Code
is virtually identical.
27. 711 S.W.2d at 363.
28. Id. at 364. The court applied the reasoning of Calvert v. Kadane, 427 S.W.2d 605,
608 (Tex. 1968). In Calvert the Texas Supreme Court held that the interpretation of an agency
administering a statute is entitled to great weight where the meaning of the statutory provision
is unclear or ambiguous.
29. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.317(c)(2) (Vernon 1982) specifically excludes:
(A) processing tangible personal property for sale as tangible personal property; (B) exploring
for, or producing and transporting, a material extracted from the earth; (C) agriculture, in-
cluding dairy or poultry operations and pumping for farm or ranch irrigation; [and]
(D) electrical processes such as electroplating, electrolysis, and cathodic protection."
30. Comptroller Hearing No. 15,800 (1985).
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151.324 of the Tax Code3' exempts drilling equipment used for the explora-
tion of oil and gas from the sales tax if the equipment is built for exclusive
use outside of Texas and if, on completion, the equipment is removed forth-
with from the state. Rule 3.332 defines forthwith as removal from the state
within a reasonable period of time from the transfer of possession of the
property, provided that there is no use or consumption of the property
within the state.3 2 The comptroller took into account circumstances in the
Texas oil and gas industry at the time the drilling rig was completed, and
concluded that storing the rig for eighteen months prior to transportation
outside the state was removal within a reasonable period of time.33
Although any application of such a standard would involve consideration of
the particular circumstances of each case, this ruling could establish a troub-
lesome precedent for the comptroller because of the substantial period of
time involved.
In a second comptroller's decision during the survey period the comptrol-
ler ruled that a soft drink bottler and distributor did not qualify for the
resale exemption with respect to sales made through vending machines. 34 In
Hearing 16,49335 the taxpayer owned and maintained the vending machines,
kept the machines in good working order, collected all coins, and assumed
any losses resulting from the use of slugs. The taxpayer argued that the
resale exemption applied because the taxpayer's contract with certain pur-
chasers required the taxpayer to quote a set price per case on the soft
drinks. 36 This arrangement had the appearance of a sale for a set price, with
the purchaser then reselling the soft drinks. In addition, the purchasers in-
cluded an instrumentality of the United States and an exempt organization;
sections 151.30937 and 151.31038 of the Tax Code exempt direct sales to
these purchasers. The comptroller noted that the Tyler court of appeals had
considered a similar arrangement in 1981. 39 The court had ruled that sales
of food and beverage from vending machines placed in facilities owned or
operated by federal governmental agencies were subject to the sales tax and
not qualified for exemption.4° Although the reasoning of the comptroller in
dismissing the set price element of the contract is not convincing, the con-
31. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.324 (Vernon 1982).
32. Texas Comp. Tax Rule No. 3.332, [1 Tex.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 66-235, at 7368
(Dec. 31, 1975).
33. Comptroller Hearing No. 15.800 (1985).
34. Comptroller Hearing No. 16,493 (June 12, 1985).
35. Id.
36. By quoting a set price for the soft drinks the taxpayer enabled the purchaser to estab-
lish the vending machine price, and thereby determine the amount of its commission.
37. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.309 (Vernon 1982) (taxable items sold, leased, or rented
to certain governmental entities are exempt from the Texas sales and use tax: exempt entities
include instrumentalities of the United States, and corporations that are agencies or instrumen-
talities of the United States).
38. Id. § 151.310 (Vernon Supp. 1987) (taxable items sold, leased, or rented to certain
non-profit tax-exempt organizations are exempt from the Texas sales and use tax).
39. Bullock v. W. & W. Vending and Food Service of Texas, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 713, 717
(Tex. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ) (issue was whether the taxpayer was an independent con-




tract appears to be an arrangement for a full service vendor, rather than a
sale for resale.
In Hearings 17,33741 and 17,33842 the comptroller narrowly construed
the exemptions for use of machinery and equipment for agricultural prod-
ucts under section 151.316 of the Tax Code.43 These exemptions require that
the machinery and equipment be used exclusively for agricultural purposes.
In these cases the taxpayer sold computer hardware to purchasers who pro-
vided an exemption certificate stating that they would only use the goods for
"farm use," though the purchasers also purchased an accounting program.
The comptroller noted that he had ruled that a computer used in part for
payroll was subject to tax because the agricultural use was not exclusive, 44
and that a single divergent use precluded application of the exemption.
Although a seller will ordinarily not know how the purchaser will actually
use property after the sale, the comptroller noted that the taxpayer in this
case was on notice of the non-exclusive use of the computer because the
purchaser acquired the accounting program at the time of purchase. The
comptroller appeared to consider whether the seller knew or should have
known that the property would not be put to the exclusive use set forth in
the exemption.
In Hearing 14,13445 the comptroller broadly defined the term "operating
assets" as used in the occasional sale exemption.46 Rule 3.316(d)(3) 47 de-
fines operating assets to include all assets used by an enterprise in providing
a product or service, but the term does not include assets maintained and
used for general business purposes in addition to use by the specific enter-
prise.48 In this case the taxpayer closed its physical plant in Houston and
sold most of the Houston assets to one purchaser. The comptroller noted
that the taxpayer had transferred various other assets to the taxpayer's other
offices. The taxpayer argued that the assets transferred to other offices were
nonoperating assets. The comptroller ruled that the occasional sale exemp-
tion did not apply because the taxpayer had used at least one of the items
transferred to another office in providing products and services in Houston,
making that asset an operating asset.
C. Procedure
In two cases the comptroller considered arguments that taxpayers had
detrimentally relied upon advice received from the comptroller, and there-
fore could not be held liable for taxes otherwise payable. In both cases the
41. Comptroller Hearing No. 17,337 (1985).
42. Comptroller Hearing No. 17,338 (Aug. 20, 1985).
43. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.316 (7), (8) (Vernon Supp. 1987) (formerly paragraphs
(8) and (9)).
44. See Comptroller Hearing No. 11,350 (Nov. 13, 1981).
45. Comptroller Hearing No. 14,134 (Nov. 26, 1984).
46. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.304 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
47. Texas Comp. Tax Rule No. 3.316(d)(3), [1 Tex.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 66-165, at




comptroller held that the taxpayers had provided neither written documen-
tation nor corroboration by an employee of the comptroller of the incorrect
advice allegedly given. 49 Generally, a taxpayer will be entitled to waiver for
detrimental reliance only if the taxpayer establishes that an employee of the
comptroller gave him guidance or direction, that the employee had sufficient
knowledge of the facts to provide correct advice, that the taxpayer followed
that advice, and that the taxpayer actually suffered as a consequence of fol-
lowing that advice.50 To utilize the detrimental reliance defense a taxpayer
should obtain written advice after providing a detailed statement of the facts
of the transaction, and the taxpayer must follow that advice.
In Hearing 16,93951 the comptroller ruled that the taxpayer was obligated
to pay the full amount of sales tax collected from a purchaser even though
the sales tax had been overstated. In this case the taxpayer calculated the
sales tax due on the gross purchase price of items sold, and then deducted an
allowance for a trade-in. When the taxpayer remitted the sales tax to the
state, the taxpayer corrected the amount of sales tax due by deducting the
trade-in allowance from the gross price before calculating the sales tax. The
taxpayer did not, however, contact the purchasers and attempt to refund any
portion of the sales tax erroneously collected. Thus the comptroller ruled
that section 111.01652 of the Tax Code required the taxpayer to pay the
gross amount of sales tax collected to the state.
D. 1986 Tax Legislation
The Texas legislature, in a special session, raised the limited sales, excise
and use tax rate from 4.125% to 5.25% for all sales during the period from
January 1, 1987 through August 31, 1987. 5 3 Receipts from the sale, rental,
storage, use, or consumption of taxable items will be taxed at the old 4.125%
rate, however, if the items are used for the performance of a written contract
entered into prior to January 1, 1987, and the contract is not subject to
change or modification by reason of the tax increase, or if the items are used
pursuant to an obligation under a bid submitted prior to January 1, 1987,
and the bid is not withdrawn, modified, or changed by reason of the tax
increase. 54
After December 4, 1986, the state will not pay any interest on refunds of
erroneously paid taxes, due to the repeal of section 111.106 of the Tax
Code. 5  Section 111.106 provided for payment of ten percent interest on
refunds.5 6 Under section 111.060 of the Tax Code57 the state will continue
49. Comptroller Hearing No. 17,879 (Sept. 6, 1985); Comptroller Hearing No. 17,091
(Sept. 3, 1985).
50. Comptroller Hearing No. 14,541 (Sept. 20, 1985).
51. Comptroller Hearing No. 16,939 (Oct. 8, 1985).
52. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.016 (Vernon 1982) provides that "[a]ny person who
receives or collects a tax or any money represented to be a tax from another person is liable to
the state for the full amount of the taxes .. "
53. Id. § 151.051(b) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
54. Acts 1986, 69th Leg., 3d Sess., p. 25-26, ch. 10, § 5A, effective January 1, 1987.
55. Acts 1986, 69th Leg., 2d Sess., p. 28, ch. 8, § 1, effective December 4, 1986.
56. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.106 (Vernon 1982) (repealed).
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to collect ten percent interest on delinquent taxes.
During the special session the legislature amended the Local Sales and
Use Tax Act 58 and adopted a new County Sales and Use Tax Act 59 authoriz-
ing certain counties to impose a sales and use tax. In addition, the legisla-
ture has added a new article 1118z to Title 28, 60 authorizing cities to impose
a sales and use tax to support a City Transit District.
The legislature has added section 2A to the Local Sales and Use Tax Act 61
and amended other sections of the Act to authorize certain cities and towns
to adopt an additional sales and use tax of one-half of one percent of the
receipts from the sale at retail of all taxable items within the city adopting
the tax. 62 Previously, the statute authorized cities and towns to impose a
sales and use tax not to exceed one percent. 63 In addition, the one-half of
one percent additional tax is imposed on receipts from the sale at retail
within the city of gas and electricity for residential use, unless the residential
use is exempted from the local sales and use tax already imposed by the
cities. Thus, cities that have adopted a local sales and use tax since 1979
cannot impose the additional tax on the sale of gas and electricity for resi-
dential use. 64
The following cities may not adopt the additional sales and use tax: (1) a
city included within the boundaries of a rapid transit authority; (2) a city
included within the boundaries of a regional transportation authority created
by a "principal city" having a population of less than 800,000; (3) a city
wholly or partly located in a county that contains territory within the
boundaries of a regional transportation authority created by a principal city
having a population in excess of 800,000, unless the city is a contiguous city;
and (4) a city which imposes a sales and use tax to support the city transit
department as authorized by new article 111 8z. 65 A qualified city or town
may adopt the new additional sales and use tax only by majority vote in an
election held for that purpose. 66 Section 26.041 of the Tax Code requires
that the revenue produced by the additional local sales be used to reduce
property taxes in the city. 67
The legislature amended article 2353e of the Revised Civil Statutes68 to
57. Id. § 111.060 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
58. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1066c (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1987).
59. Id. art. 2353e, §§ 20-32 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
60. Id. art. 1118z, §§ 1-12 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1987).
61. Id. art. 1066c, § 2A.
62. Id. §§ 4, 5.
63. Id.
64. Id. § 2A.B.
65. Id. § 2A.A.
66. Id. § 2a.C.
67. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 26.041 (Vernon Supp. 1987). The city must calculate the
amount of additional sales and use tax revenues to be received during each year that the city
imposes this additional tax. If the amount so determined exceeds the amount of additional tax
used in the preceding year to reduce property taxes, the property tax rate must be reduced
again; if the amount of taxes to be received in the current year is determined to be less than the
amount received in the prior year, the property tax rate must be increased.
68. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2353e, §§ 20-32 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
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include an new county sales and use tax authorizing a county to impose a
sales and use tax of either one-half of one percent or one percent of sales at
retail of all taxable items within the county, if no part of the county is lo-
cated in either a rapid transit authority or a regional transportation author-
ity. If a county does adopt such a tax, neither a rapid transit authority nor a
regional transportation authority may impose a sales or use tax in that
county. 69 The rate will be one-half of one percent if there is an incorporated
city or town within the county, and will be one percent if there is no incorpo-
rated city or town within the county.7 0 To adopt such a tax the tax must be
approved by a majority vote in an election held to approve the tax.7' Section
26.04272 added to the Tax Code, a provision that county property taxes will
be reduced by the sales and use tax collected in a manner similar to that
under Section 26.041. 7 3
New article 1118274 authorizes an incorporated city or town operating a
mass transportation system and having a population of 56,000 or more to
create a city transit department and cause that department to levy a special
sales and use tax of either one-fourth of one percent or one-half of one per-
cent to finance the system. A city or town may not, however, create a city
transit department with authority to levy such a tax if: (1) the city or town
is located wholly or partly within a county, federal metropolitan statistical
area, or primary statistical area containing a city included in a metropolitan
rapid transit authority or regional transportation authority; and (2) such city
is a "principal city" as defined in the law authorizing such a metropolitan
rapid transit authority or regional transportation authority.7 5 A city council
of an eligible incorporated city or town may create a mass transit depart-
ment by resolution at any time after September 1, 1987: the council must call
an election to approve the tax.76 Section 26.043 of the Tax Code77 requires a
reduction in the property taxes imposed by a city which has adopted a city
transit department sales and use tax.
Local sales and use taxes collected by the comptroller and deposited with
the state treasurer will not earn any interest for the local authorities, and any
interest earned from such taxes while on deposit with the state treasurer will
be credited to the state general revenue fund. 78 To implement this change
the following sections have been amended, effective September 7, 1986: sec-
tion 8(a) of article 1066c,79 section 1 B(B)(f) of article I 18x,80 and section
16(f)(5) of article 1118y.8 1
69. Id. § 21.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 26.042 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
73. See supra note 67.
74. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1118z (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1987).
75. Id. § 2.
76. Id. § 3.
77. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 26.043 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
78. Acts 1986, 69th Leg. 2d Sess., p. 3-9, ch. 2, effective September 7, 1986.
79. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1066c, § 8(a) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1987).
80. Id. 1118x, § 1IB(B)(f).
81. Id. art. ll18y, § 16(f)(5).
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E. Sales Tax Procedure
During the Survey period the comptroller adopted and amended a number
of rules. The comptroller amended rule 3.29982 in response to the Austin
court of appeals decision in Bullock v. Cordovan Corp.83 Under amended
rule 3.299(b)(3), the publisher of a controlled circulation magazine must col-
lect sales tax from persons who advertise in the magazine based upon the
sales price of the magazine. 84 The publisher is also required to separately
state the charge for advertising and the sales price of the magazine; the sales
price must be reasonable, and will be considered so if the publication meets
second class postal rate requirements. 85 This rule, however, does not apply
to magazines provided as part of membership in an organization if either a
part of membership dues is identified as the sale price of the magazine plus
tax, or the membership dues do not identify the sales price of the magazine,
but the organization paid the sales tax on the cost of publication. 86
The comptroller amended rule 3.29887 to provide an objective test for de-
termining whether an amusement event will qualify for exemption where a
nonprofit organization is a co-provider of the event. Under section 151.3101
of the Tax Code88 and rule 3.298, amusement services provided by nonprofit
organizations or other exempt entities are generally exempt from sales tax.
Further, if an exempt entity is a co-provider of an amusement event, the
event will be exempt if the exempt provider establishes it has a substantial
financial investment in the event. As amended, rule 3.298(g)(3)(C) 89 now
provides that an exempt provider may establish its substantial financial in-
volvement by a written contract signed prior to the date of the event under
which the co-providers agree that the nonprofit organization will receive at
least twenty percent of the net profit, and will pay at least twenty percent of
all losses incurred in producing the event.
The comptroller amended rule 3.308, 90 concerning taxation of computer
software, to include a definition of "non-custom software" and deleted the
definition of "custom computer program" from the rule. The comptroller
will consider a program non-custom software, and therefore taxable, if
(1) the source code cannot be modified by the seller (other than by inserting
file names or formatting data); (2) the program can be replaced by the ven-
dor at the same charge as for the original; (3) copies of the program are
82. Texas Comp. Tax Rule No. 3.299, [1 Tex.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 66-087, at 7303-04
(May 21, 1986).
83. 697 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see supra § 1-6 and ac-
companying text.
84. Texas Comp. Tax Rule No. 3.299(b)(3), [1 Tex.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 66-087, at
7304 (May 21, 1986).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Texas Comp. Tax Rule No. 3.298, [1 Tex.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) p 66-082, at 7299-305
(May 5, 1986).
88. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.3101 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
89. Texas Comp. Tax Rule No. 3.298(g)(3)(C), [1 Tex.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 66-082, at
7304 (May 5, 1986).




mass-produced for the manufacturer, inventoried by a vendor, or otherwise
held for repeated sale, license, or lease; or (4) the program is sold, licensed,
or leased by means of a "shrink-wrapped," "box-top," or "tear-open" license
agreement or bill of sale.9 1
The comptroller amended and expanded the rule governing application of
the sales and use tax to persons engaged in the graphic arts. Rule 3.31292
now includes photographers, commercial artists, portrait painters, and per-
sons who draw, paint, engrave, and etch as graphic artists. Persons who
paint or apply decorative material to tangible personal property are also con-
sidered to be engaged in graphic art activities. Sales tax is not due on
charges for furnishing original letters or other printed material or carbon
copies produced simultaneously with the original. Sales tax must be col-
lected, however, on the total charge for producing multiple copies of printed
material, regardless of the type of equipment used in production.
The comptroller has adopted rule 3.35393 to reduce administrative costs of
maintaining sales tax permits for permit holders who are inactive. Under
this rule, a permit will be cancelled due to abandonment if a permit holder
has no business activity, which is defined as zero gross sales, zero taxable
sales, and zero taxable purchases. An applicant whose permit is canceled
under this rule may apply for a new sales tax permit.
II. PROPERTY TAX
A. Application of Tax
In Dallas County Appraisal District v. L.D. Brinkman & Co. 94 the Dallas
court of appeals limited the statutory presumption that exempts property
brought into the state for no longer than 175 days from property tax. Sec-
tion 11.01 of the Tax Code exempts from taxation property that is only tem-
porarily located in Texas. 95 The Tax Code presumes that property is located
only temporarily in Texas if the taxpayer imports the goods from out of state
and then ships the goods out of state within 175 days.96 In Brinkman the
trial court had excluded from tax the portion of the taxpayer's inventory
that the taxpayer intended to ship out of Texas within 175 days. 97
The Dallas court of appeals held that, regardless of whether the taxpayer's
inventory satisfied the statutory presumption for exemption, the goods still
may be subject to tax if the Texas constitution does not exempt the goods
from taxation and if federal law considers the goods to be in Texas for longer
91. Texas Comp. Tax Rule No. 3.308(b)(1) [1 Tex.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 66-127, at 7314
(Nov. 11, 1985).
92. Texas Comp. Tax Rule No. 3.312, [1 Tex.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 66-150, at 7317-2
(Feb. 12, 1986).
93. Texas. Comp. Tax Rule No. 3.353, [1 Tex.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 66-330, at 7411
(Aug. 4, 1986).
94. 701 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
95. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.01(c) (Vernon 1982).
96. Id. § 1.01(d).
97. 701 S.W.2d at 21.
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than a temporary period.98 After finding that the Texas constitution did not
exempt the taxpayer's goods from taxation, the court concluded that federal
law considers goods as located only temporarily in a state if the goods are in
interstate transit. 99 Federal law considers goods in interstate transit as lo-
cated in a state more than temporarily, however, if the owner halts the
transit of the goods for business purposes unrelated to necessary transporta-
tion delays."°° In Brinkman the taxpayer brought goods from out of state to
its Texas warehouse, where the taxpayer segregated certain goods which had
been presold to out of state customers before shipping this portion out of
state. Since the taxpayer had not halted the transit of the goods merely as
part of a necessary transportation delay, the court held that the taxpayer had
detained all the goods in Texas for business purposes and thus had subjected
the goods to state or local property taxes.101
In Arkansas County Appraisal Review Board v. Texas Gulf Shrimp Co. '0 2
the Corpus Christi court of appeals held unconstitutional section 21.03(a) of
the Tax Code. This section taxes only the portion of the total value of per-
sonal property that reflects the property's use in Texas and applies only to
property continually used outside the state. 10 3 In Texas Gulf Shrimp Co. the
taxpayer operated shrimp trawlers seventy percent of the year in the Gulf of
Mexico, outside the boundaries of Texas. The trawlers were domiciled in
Texas and never acquired a tax situs in another state or nation. The tax
assessors argued that the statute creates a partial exemption not authorized
by the Texas constitution or required by some overriding federal law. 1° 4
Further, the tax assessors argued that, if the Texas constitution or other
federal law does not authorize a tax exemption, a statute that taxes property
with a taxable situs in the state at less than its fair value is effectively provid-
ing an exemption from tax and, thus, is unconstitutional as a matter of law.
The taxpayer argued that section 21.03(a) did not provide a tax exemption,
but rather defined the tax situs of property following federal constitutional
restrictions. The Corpus Christi court of appeals concluded that the Texas
constitution does not permit exemption of travelers. 10 5 In addition the court
held that federal law does not restrict the state's power to tax the shrimp
trawlers since Texas permitted the trawlers to use Texas port facilities and to
receive benefits from their use.10 6
In Coastal State Petroleum Co. v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dis-
98. Id. at 22. The Texas constitution taxes all real and tangible personal property located
in Texas, unless the constitution otherwise specifically arthorizes an exemption. TEX. CONST.
art. VIII, §§ 1-2. The court recognized that federal law sometimes limits a state's power to
tax. 701 S.W.2d at 22. The court thus would uphold the statutory presumption only to the
extent authorized by the Texas constitution or by federal law. Id.
99. 701 S.W.2d at 23.
100. General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 230-32 (1908).
101. 701 S.W.2d at 23.
102. 707 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
103. TEX. TAX. CODE ANN. § 21.03(a) (Vernon 1982).
104. This argument is similar to the reasoning of the Dallas court of appeals in Brinkman.
701 S.W.2d at 22; see supra note 98 and accompanying text.
105. 707 S.W.2d at 192.
106. Id. at 191-92.
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trict 107 the Corpus Christi court of appeals affirmed the trial court's holding
that the valuation of crude oil held at the taxpayer's refinery was not exces-
sive or discriminatory and that the assessment should not be set aside. 108
The taxing authority had valued the crude oil inventory using comparable
market values,10 9 but had ignored certain federal guidelines that were in ef-
fect at the time. Under these guidelines a refinery could sell its oil at a price
based upon the refiner's consistent and historical accounting practices as
long as this price did not exceed the refiner's actual cost for the inventory,
plus any transportation expenses. In accordance with these guidelines and
its accounting practices, the taxpayer valued its inventory at book value us-
ing the last-in first-out accounting method.1 10 The court concluded that the
federal energy price rules controlled only the price that the taxpayer could
charge its customers and did not determine the oil's market value."' The
court, citing State v. Whittenburg," 2 recognized that property tax assess-
ment is a quasi-judicial function and that courts should not set aside a valua-
tion by a board of equalization absent compelling circumstances." 3 The
court noted that under federal regulations, a refinery could sell crude oil for
up to $30.00 a barrel. The court consequently concluded that the evidence
presented to the trial court indicated that book value was not a proper mea-
sure of taxable value.1 4 The court held that the taxpayer failed to show that
the board of equalization's valuation was excessive.' ' 5
B. Specific Exemptions
In Grand Prairie Hospital Authority v. Tarrant Appraisal District 1 6 the
Fort Worth court of appeals held that a medical office building leased by a
hospital authority to private physicians was not used exclusively for public
purposes and, therefore, that section 11.1 (a) of the Tax Code did not ex-
empt the building from property tax. 117 The court ruled that the hospital
authority did not use the property exclusively for the benefit of the public
107. 707 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
108. Id. at 213.
109. The taxing authority determined the market value of the taxpayer's inventory based
on price averages and other information from the Department of Energy, prices from the
Texas railroad commission, and the values of crude oil at other refineries. Id. at 209.
110. The taxpayer valued its inventory at $15.63 and $15.65 per barrel for the years in
question, when its actual average cost per barrel was $30.08 and $29.62. The taxing authority
had valued the inventory at $21.00 and $28.00 per barrel.
111. 707 S.W.2d at 212.
112. 153 Tex. 205, 209-10, 265 S.W.2d 569, 572-73, (1954).
113. 707 S.W.2d at 210. The court also cited Richardson v. Kent, 47 S.W.2d 420 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1932, no writ). In Richardson the court held that in order for it to set aside
the assessed value by the property, the assessed value must so exceed the fair market value as
to shock a correct mind, thereby raising a presumption of fraudulent valuation. Id. at 425.
114. 707 S.W.2d at 212.
115. Id. at 213.
116. 707 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
117. Id. at 284. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.1l(a) (Vernon 1982) exempts from property
tax any property owned by a political subdivision provided that the property is used for public
purposes. The political subdivision must use the property exclusively for the benefits of the
public for the property to be tax-exempt. TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 9.
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since private doctors leased offices in the building for their own commercial
benefit. 118
In a similar fact situation the attorney general issued an opinion1 19 that a
hospital district's lease of a portion of a building to two nonprofit corpora-
tions and a state agency did not subject the building to property tax. The
attorney general noted that the Texas Supreme Court has consistently held
that public property is tax-exempt if used primarily for the health, comfort
and welfare of the public. 120 The attorney general concluded that public
property does not lose its tax-exempt status merely because a charge is made
for the use of the property, provided that the charges are incidental to the
public use and the proceeds inure to the benefit of the political
subdivision. 121
In another opinion the attorney general ruled that a city airport's lease of
a facility to a private individual for the purpose of selling fuel to airport
operators, subject to the directions of the city, satisfied the public purpose
test that exempts property from property tax. 122 The attorney general, how-
ever, determined that the city airport's lease of land surrounding the airport
for the purposes of farming and ranching did not meet the public purpose
test.1 23 The property was therefore subject to property tax. 124
In General Association Branch Davidian Seventh Day Adventist v. McLen-
nan County Appraisal District 125 the Waco court of appeals denied an ex-
emption from ad valorem taxes under section 11.20 of the Tax Code for a
seventy-five acre tract of land adjacent to a church's property on the ground
that the property was not an actual place of worship. 126 In order for its real
property to qualify for tax exemption under section 11.20(a), a religious or-
ganization must use the property primarily as a place of regular religious
worship and must reasonably need to use the property to engage in religious
worship. 127 In General Association Branch the church argued that under its
religious beliefs the church members held the land to be sacred and that the
church used the land for the health and education of its members. The land,
however, was used during the time in question as a range for animals owned
by the church, for walking, and for the health, welfare and education of its
members. The court concluded that the church had failed to meet its burden
of proof. 128
118. 707 S.W.2d at 284.
119. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-405 (1985).
120. Id.; see Satterlee v. Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Auth., 576 S.W.2d 773, reh'g denied,
576 S.W.2d 770, 779 (Tex. 1978).
121. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-405 (1985); see Lower Colorado River Auth. v. Chemical
Bank and Trust Com., 144 Tex. 326, 332-33, 190 S.W.2d 48, 50-51 (1945).
122. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-464 (1986). For a discussion of the public purpose test
see supra note 117 and accompanying text.
123. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-464 (1986).
124. Id.
125. 715 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App.-Waco 1986, no writ).
126. Id. at 343.
127. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.20(a) (Vernon 1982).
128. 715 S.W.2d at 393. The Texas Supreme Court has held that courts must narrowly
and strictly construe claims for tax exemption and that the claimant was the burden of proving
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In Waterwood Improvement Association v. San Jacinto County Appraisal
Review Board 129 the Beaumont court of appeals held that a homeowners'
association's land was not entitled to an exemption from property taxes
under section 23.18 of the Tax Code. Waterwood involved a timber land
that a developer conveyed to the homeowners' association and that would
revert to the developer if the association failed to use the property for recrea-
tional or educational purposes. Section 23.18 mandates that an appraiser
value certain property that a nonprofit homeowners' organization holds for
the use, benefit, and enjoyment of its members at nominal value to avoid
double taxation. 130 The association argued that because of the deed restric-
tions the timber land had a nominal value of only one dollar. The court
concluded that the timber land was not property held for the benefit of the
homeowner's association since the timber provided the sole value of the
land. 131
In Bower v. Edwards County Appraisal District 132 the San Antonio court
of appeals held that land used for deer hunting leases is not land used for
agricultural use and, therefore, is not entitled to be valued for tax purposes
under the method set forth in the Texas constitution. 133 The constitution
defines agricultural use as the business of raising livestock or growing crops,
the profit from which constitutes the owner's primary source of income.134
The taxpayer argued that raising deer for human consumption fits within the
broad definition of agricultural use. The court noted that the State Property
Tax Board's Guidelines exclude wild deer from the definition of livestock
and concluded that the principal use of the land in this case was for hunting
and recreation and not for agricultural use.' 35
C. Procedure
During the Survey period the courts reaffirmed the requirement that a
party must pursue its administrative remedies under chapters 41 and 42 of
the Tax Code to be entitled to judicial review. In Dallas County Appraisal
District v. La! 136 the Dallas court of appeals held that the taxpayer lost his
right to challenge the administrative decision in district court since he failed
to file a notice of protest as required by section 41.44 of the Tax Code. 137
the fact issue of what constitutes an actual place of religious worship. Davies v. Meyer, 541
S.W.2d 827, 829 (Tex. 1976).
129. 697 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
130. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.18(a) (Vernon 1982). Property such as swimming pools,
parks, meeting halls, parking lots, tennis courts or other similar property qualify for nominal
valuation. Id. The court noted that it found no cases construing the statute. 697 S.W.2d at
836.
131. 697 S.W.2d at 835-36.
132. 697 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
133. Id. at 529-30; see TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-d(a).
134. TEx. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-d-1.
135. 697 S.W.2d at 530.
136. 701 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
137. Id. at 46 (citing Rockdale Indep. School Dist. v. Thorndale Indep. School Dist., 681
S.W.2d 225 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.44(Vernon Supp. 1987)). For further discussion of Rockdale, see supra note 12, at 713.
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The courts also continue to strictly apply the notice of appeal requirements
of section 42.06 of the Tax Code. 138 In Town Square Associates v. Angelina
County Appraisal District 139 the Beaumont court of appeals reaffirmed that a
taxpayer's notice of appeal must be properly served on the appraisal district
and the appraisal review board to perfect judicial review of the final order of
the review board.140 The court noted that the Dallas court of appeals
reached the same conclusion in Corchine Partnership v. Dallas County Ap-
praisal District.14 1 In a similar case the Texarkana court of appeals ruled
that the time requirements in section 42.06 of the Tax Code are statutes of
limitations, which if not pleaded are waived. 14 2 The appraisal district ne-
glected to raise the taxpayer's failure to comply with the time limitations
until its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court ruled
that as statutes of limitations the time requirements are an affirmative de-
fense that the appraisal district must pleaded.' 43
In Gruy v. Jim Hogg County Appraisal District I" the Texarkana court of
appeals held that a taxpayer's appearance before the review board waives
any defense concerning a prior defect in notice.' 45 The appraisal district had
failed to comply with section 25.19 of the Tax Code,146 which requires writ-
ten notice to the taxpayer of the reappraisal of its agricultural land within
twenty days before the date the board begins to consider the protest. The
taxpayers, however, appeared at a full hearing before the board, and the
court ruled that the taxpayer's voluntarily appearance waived any prior de-
fect in notice. 147
In Garza v. Block Distributing Co. 148 the San Antonio court of appeals
held that the appraisal board must first give a taxpayer notice of a proposed
increase in the valuation of his property before the board may acquire juris-
diction to consider any increase in valuation. 49 In Block the taxpayer paid
the assessed tax, which the appraisal district had based on its appraisal of the
taxpayer's prior year's liquor inventory. After certifying the tax roll, the tax
assessor-collector prepared a supplemental tax roll based on information
from the Alcoholic Beverage Commission, which increased the valuation of
the taxpayer's inventory. The court ruled that the appraisal board lacked
jurisdiction to consider the increase in the taxpayer's inventory since due
process requires that the board first provide a taxpayer with notice and the
opportunity to be heard before encumbering this property with an additional
138. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.06 (Vernon 1982).
139. 709 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, no writ).
140. Id. at 777-78.
141. 695 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). For further discussion of
Corchine, see Collins, supra note 12, at 713.
142. Morris County Appraisal Dist. v. Nail, 708 S.W.2d 473, 474 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
143. Id.
144. 715 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, no writ).
145. Id. at 172.
146. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.19 (Vernon 1982).
147. 715 S.W.2d at 172.
148. 696 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).




In another case during the Survey period the Eastland court of appeals
defined property owner for purposes of determining who is entitled to appeal
the final order of the review board under section 42.01 of the Tax Code. 151
The lessee of an airplane had appealed the appraisal review board's tax as-
sessment of the plane, and the appraisal district had challenged the lessee's
standing to appeal under section 42.01. The court first noted that the Tax
Code does not define property owner. 152 The court then ruled that an owner
is one who owns property or has legal or rightful title, whether he possesses
it or not. 153 The court noted that since the lessor retained ownership and
title to the airplane, the taxpayer-lessee was not the property owner of the
airplane, and therefore was not the proper party to bring an action to appeal
the order of the appraisal review board. 154
In a similar case, Robstown Independent School District v. Anderson,155 the
Texas Supreme Court ruled that a taxpayer's failure to comply with the ad-
ministrative procedure of first filing his protest of nonownership with the
appraisal review board precludes him from later raising this defense in a suit
brought to enforce collection of delinquent taxes. 156 The taxpayer raised the
defense of non-ownership of property for the first time at the district court
level. The supreme court noted that section 41.41 of the Tax Code157 re-
quires a taxpayer to protest the determination that he was the owner of
property before the appraisal board. 158 The court noted that the taxpayer
waived this defense by failing to comply with the administrative review
procedures. 159
In City of Heath v. King 160 the Dallas court of appeals held that no statu-
tory basis exists for a proration of taxes under section 21.01 of the Tax
Code. 16 1 Section 21.01 provides that a city may tax real property if the
property is located within the city limits on January 1st of the year of which
the taxes are assessed. 162 The taxpayers had contended that the city had no
power to levy taxes against their property after the date for which their
property was disannexed from the city. The court strictly construed the
statute and held that no basis for a proration of taxes existed and that the tax
assessor could not take into account circumstances occurring after the first
150. Id.
151. Bennett-Barnes Investments Co. v. Brown County Appraisal Dist., 696 S.W.2d 208
(Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.01 (Vernon 1982)
provides that a property owner is entitled to appeal the appraisal review board's tax assessment
order.
152. 696 S.W.2d at 209.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 706 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. 1986).
156. Id. at 952-53.
157. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.41 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
158. 706 S.W.2d at 952.
159. Id. at 952-53 (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.09 (Vernon 1982)).
160. 705 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
161. Id. at 814.
162. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 21.01 (Vernon 1982).
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day of January when assessing property taxes. 163
In Kyle v. Stone 164 taxpayers contended that the city must include its
budget surplus from the preceding year when computing the ad valorem tax
rate for the present year. The city had carried over a portion of its general
fund balance as a cash surplus. The court concluded that Texas law gives a
city discretion on levying taxes and that the Texas constitution and the city's
charter imply that the city has the power to maintain a reasonable budget
surplus. 165
D. Property Tax Rules
The comptroller adopted several amendments to the property tax rules
during the Survey period. Rule 165.142 adopts the State Property Tax
Board's revised model form for the Notice of Protest used by taxpayers in
filing protests with a local appraisal review board. 166 The simplified form
reflects the Property Tax Code's changes in the taxpayer's time period for
filing a protest. Amended rule 155.17 revises the contents of the exemption
application form for charitable organizations. 167 The rule now requires ad-
ditional information concerning the financial activities of the charitable or-
ganization and the use of the property by the applicant. The comptroller
adopted similar rules to revise the exemption application forms for youth
groups, religious organizations and privately owned schools. 68 Rule 161.1
adopts by reference the Guidelines for the Valuation of Agricultural Lands
as revised by the State Property Tax Board. 169 The new guidelines conform
the definition of "net to land" to that of the Property Tax Code. Rules
165.71 through 165.77170 adopt the State Property Tax Board's new proce-
dures for administrative hearings concerning the findings of the taxable
property value by a school district. The new rules outline the procedures for
protesting determinations of school district's taxable value and determina-
tions of an appraisal district's level and uniformity of property appraisals.
III. FRANCHISE TAXES
A. Calculation of Taxable Capital
In Central Power & Light Co. v. Bullock 171 the Austin court of appeals
held that an investment tax credit shown as a liability constitutes a part of a
163. 705 S.W.2d at 814.
164. 699 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
165. Id. at 579.
166. Tex. Comp. Tax Rule No. 165.142, [1 Tex.] ST. TAX REP. (CCH) 28-630, at 4465
(Jan. 21, 1986).
167. Tex. comp. Tax Rule No. 155.17, [1 Tex.] ST. TAX REP. (CCH) 28-203, at 4327-28
(Jan. 21, 1986).
168. Tex. Comp. Tax Rule Nos. 155.18-.20, [1 Tex.] ST. TAX REP. (CCH) [ 28-205 to 28-
215, at 4328-54 (Jan. 21, 1986).
169. Tex. Comp. Tax Rule No. 161.1, [1 Tex.] ST. TAX REP. (CCH) 28-340, at 4431
(Jan. 21, 1986).
170. Tex. Comp. Tax Rules Nos. 165.71-.77, [1 Tex.] ST. TAX REP. (CCH) 28-510 to
28-535, at 4461-63 (Jan. 21, 1986).
171. 696 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
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corporation's taxable surplus under the franchise tax. 172 The taxpayer re-
ported its investment tax credit under the deferral method and stated the tax
credit as a liability. 173 The taxpayer argued that unlike the typical treatment
of ratably moving a part of the deferred credit into retained earnings over
the life of the asset, the rate regulatory process requires the taxpayer to pay
the credit ratably to the ratepayers in the form of lower utility rates. The
comptroller, however, requires in rule 3.405 that taxpayers include deferred
investment credit in surplus. 17 4 The court rejected the taxpayer's argument
that the deferred credit is a debt due the ratepayer that reduces the tax-
payer's taxable capital.175
In Enserch Corp. v. Bullock 176 the Austin court of appeals strictly con-
strued the exemption from franchise tax found in section 171.052 of the Tax
Code177 for transportation companies that pay an annual gross receipts tax.
Lone Star Gas Co. is a division of Enserch and qualifies as a gas utility. As a
gas utility, Lone Star must pay a quarterly tax based on its gross receipts. 78
Enserch argued that the company was exempt from the franchise tax since it
derived its greatest percentage of gross receipts from Lone Star's activities as
a transportation company, which pays an annual gross receipts tax.179 The
comptroller argued that the gross receipts tax imposed on Enserch requires a
taxpayer to remit its gross receipts tax on a quarterly basis and does not
satisfy the requirement for the exemption under section 171.052 of paying an
annual gross receipts tax. The court of appeals noted that the meaning of
paying an annual gross receipts tax as required in the statute was not clear,
and the court therefore concluded that Enserch failed to satisfy its burden of
proof that the exemption applied to its activities. 180
During the Survey period the comptroller rendered a number of signifi-
172. Id. at 33.
173. The court noted that corporate accounting has developed two methods of reporting
the investment credit. Most unregulated companies use a flow through method, which recog-
nizes that a reduction in income taxes flows through to retained earnings, thereby creating a
surplus in the year in which the company purchases the investment credit property. The defer-
ral method requires that the tax credit be stated as a liability that the company ratably applies
to retained earnings over the life of the investment credit property. Id. at 31.
174. Tex. Comp. Tax Rule No. 3.405(a), [1 Tex.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 14-071, at 1039
(Dec. 13, 1977).
175. 696 S.W.2d at 33.
176. 707 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
177. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.052 (Vernon 1982). In 1985 the legislature amended
§ 171.052 to end exemption of transportation companies from the franchise tax if the compa-
nies pay an annual gross receipts tax. Id. (Vernon Supp. 1987).
178. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6060, (Vernon 1982). Article 6660 requires every
gas utility to file a quarterly statement with the Railroad Commission and pay a tax equal to
one fourth of one percent of its gross receipts. Id. The Railroad Commission treats Lone Star
as a transportation company. 707 S.W.2d at 248.
179. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.052 (Vernon 1982), before being amended in 1985, pro-
vided: "A corporation that is [a] ... transportation company ... now required to pay an
annual tax measured by their gross receipts is exempted from the franchise tax."
180. 707 S.W.2d at 249. The court cited Texas Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v.
Bass, 137 Tex. 151 S.W.2d 567 (1941). In Bass, the Texas Supreme Court adopted the well
established rule of construction that when faced with a claim of exemption from taxation, a
court should liberally construe a statute in favor of the taxing authority and strictly construe
the statute against the person claiming the exemption. Id. at 6, 151 s.W.2d at 570.
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cant decisions concerning the calculation of taxable capital. Two cases ad-
dressed whether taxpayers' accounting method adjustments actually
corrected errors in the taxpayers' books and records so that the taxpayers
could obtain a tax refund.18 1 In Hearing 16,769182 the comptroller ruled
that the taxpayer's book adjustments to reclassify dividends paid as an in-
tercompany account receivable was not an actual correction of an error
under rule 3.408.183 In Hearing 14,541184 the taxpayer failed to obtain ap-
proval from the Secretary of the Treasury for the method used to allocate
tax liability among the members of its affiliated group. The taxpayer
claimed that its failure to obtain such approval resulted in its not making
any election. The taxpayer argued that it was then free to retroactively ad-
just its books and at the same time adopt a more favorable allocation method
set forth in the Internal Revenue Code. The comptroller ruled that the tax-
payer's failure to obtain approval of the allocation method used was not an
actual book error so as to allow the taxpayer to claim a refund for franchise
tax purposes.18 5
In Hearings 8727 and 13,388,186 involving the same taxpayer, the comp-
troller determined that a holding company was actually doing business in
Texas for the purpose of assessing the franchise tax.'8 7 The taxpayer per-
formed the basic business of a holding company, investing, managing invest-
ments, and seeking out new investments. The taxpayer argued that the
definitions of doing business for franchise tax purposes'8 8 and transacting
business for purposes of the Texas Business Corporation Act 8 9 are identical,
and that its activities as a holding company did not constitute doing busi-
ness. The comptroller noted that the definition of doing business is much
broader than merely transacting business.' 90 The comptroller also noted
that the taxpayer held director and stockholder meetings in Texas, managed
investments in Texas, rented office space in Texas, and employed most of its
workers in Texas. The comptroller held that the taxpayer performed virtu-
ally every activity that a holding company could perform and found that
nothing in the tax statutes, legislative history, or case law could be construed
to hold that the taxpayer was not doing business in the state for the purposes
181. Comptroller Hearing Nos. 14,541 (Sept. 20, 1985) and 16,769 (Aug. 20, 1985).
182. Comptroller Hearing No. 16,769 (Aug. 20, 1985).
183. Id.; see Tex. Comp. Tax Rule No. 3.408, [1 Tex.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 14-086, at
1042 (Oct. 19, 1979). This rule prevents the revaluation of franchise tax liability for a prior
year due to an adjustment or change in a later year to a corporation's books and records,
unless the adjustment or change actually corrects an error in the books and records. Id.
184. Comptroller Hearing No. 14,541 (Sept. 20, 1985).
185. Id.
186. Comptroller Hearing Nos. 8,727 and 13,338 (Oct. 31, 1985) (two hearings involving
same taxpayer consolidated into one opinion).
187. Id.
188. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.001 (Vernon 1982) imposes a franchise tax on any cor-
poration that does business in Texas. The Tax Code, however, does not define doing business
in Texas.
189. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.05 (Vernon Supp. 1987) mentioning transacting
business in Texas, but does not define the term.




of the franchise tax. 191
In Hearing 13,946192 the comptroller restated his position that under rule
3.391193 a taxpayer must file its franchise tax report in accordance with the
taxpayer's books and records and not with federal income tax reporting
methods. 194 The comptroller required the taxpayer to report for franchise
tax purposes its long-term construction contracts under the percentage of
completion method utilized on its books and records and not under the com-
pleted contract method utilized for its federal income tax return. 19 5
B. Apportionment of Capital: Business in Texas
In Hearing 7546196 the comptroller ruled that the taxpayer must include
proceeds from the sale of natural gas to interstate pipeline customers in
Texas who then moved the gas to points outside Texas in gross receipts for
the calculation of business done in Texas. 197 Since the pipeline companies
accepted delivery of the natural gas in Texas, the comptroller held that sec-
tion 12.02(l)(b)(i) of the Tax Code required inclusion of the receipts from
the sale.198 The comptroller noted that in Bullock v. Enserch Exploration,
Inc. 199 the court held that whether goods travelled on interstate commerce
did not affect the application of section 12.01(l)(b)(i). Section 12.02(l)(b)(i)
will allocate gross receipts to Texas if, at the time of sale, property is deliv-
ered or shipped to a purchaser in Texas.2° ° In section 7546 the sales con-
tract stipulated that the title to the natural gas passes to the buyer in Texas.
In Hearing 16,164201 the comptroller ruled that a foreign corporation
should include receipts from the leasing of piggyback trailers to Texas corpo-
rations in receipts attributable to business done in Texas because the leased
property had a tax situs in Texas during the period of the lease. 20 2 Since the
trailers spent a significant amount of time in Texas during the lease period,
the comptroller held that the leased property obtained a tax situs in Texas,
191. Comptroller Hearing Nos. 8,727 and 13,388 (Oct. 31, 1985).
192. Comptroller Hearing No. 13,946 (Oct. 10, 1985).
193. Tex. Comp. Tax Rule No. 3.391, [1 Tex.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 14-001, at 993-94
(Oct. 19, 1979).
194. Comptroller Hearing No. 13,946 (Oct. 10, 1985).
195. Id.
196. Comptroller Hearing No. 7546 (Sept. 30, 1985).
197. Id.
198. Id.; see TEX. TAX-GEN. ANN. art. 12.02(1)(b)(i) (Vernon 1982) (codified as TEX.
TAX CODE ANN. § 171.103(1) (Vernon 1987)). Under this section gross receipts of a corpora-
tion from business done in Texas include the sale of tangible personal property if the property
is delivered or shipped to a buyer in Texas, regardless of the F.O.B. point or other conditions
of sale. Id.
199. 614 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Tex. App.-Austin 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 946 (1982).
200. TEX. TAX-GEN. ANN. art. 12.02(1)(b)(i) (Vernon 1982) (codified as TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 171.103(1) (Vernon 1987)).
201. Comptroller Hearing No. 16,164 (Oct. 21, 1985).
202. Id. Both the taxpayer and the tax division claim that Comptroller Hearing No. 3998
(1968) is controlling. In Hearing 3998 the comptroller determined that in applying the
franchise tax to a lease, the calculation of business done in Texas is based on the determination
as to where the leased property was situated during the time of the lease.
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even though the trailers were never permanently stationed in Texas.203
Also noteworthy is an attorney general's opinion that, under section
171.105 of the Tax Code,2° 4 oil received under an oil exchange agreement or
an oil matching buy/sell agreement constituted a receipt for franchise tax
purposes.20 5 Section 171.105 provides that gross receipts include receipts
from the sale of tangible personal property.20 6 The attorney general noted
that courts have defined a sale as any transfer from one person to another for
valuable consideration. 20 7 The attorney general held that this definition
would include an exchange and thus the oil received in an exchange would
be a receipt from a sale.208
The comptroller has adopted revised rule 3.393 that outlines the proce-
dures a corporation must follow to adopt a special reporting method for
allocating and apportioning business activities between Texas and other lo-
cations.20 9 The revised rule no longer denies a corporation permission to use
a special reporting method if the petitioning corporation is delinquent in
filing its prior franchise tax returns. The rule requires that any petition for
special reporting must be filed with the comptroller by March 1 of the year
in which the annual franchise report is due.2 10 The comptroller amended
paragraph (a)(2) of the rule to provide that, if the comptroller requests addi-
tional information to make a determination on a petition, the taxpayer must
submit the information within ninety days after the later of the original due
date of the tax return or the date of the comptroller's request. 2 11 Revised
rule 3.393(a)(4) provides that a corporation's failure to notify the comptrol-
ler of changes in the corporation's organizational structure, including any
merger, consolidation, or other reorganization will not automatically revoke
the permission granted to the corporation to use the special reporting
method. 2 12 If, however, the corporation fails to notify the comptroller and
the comptroller discovers that the corporation is no longer eligible for spe-
cial reporting, the comptroller will revoke the special reporting privilege
granted to the corporation retroactively to the first day of ineligibility and
assess penalties pursuant to Tax Code section 171.362.213 The comptroller
also amended rule 3.393(a)(3) to allow a corporation that had previously
used a special reporting method to file a report using the regular statutory
203. Comptroller Hearing No. 16,164 (Oct. 21, 1985).
204. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.105 (Vernon 1982).
205. Texas Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-478 (1986).
206. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.105 (Vernon 1982).
207. See McKinney v. City of Abilene, 250 S.W.2d 924, 925 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
208. Texas Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-478 (1986).





213. Id. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.362 Vernon (1982) imposes a priority of five percent
of the total tax due.
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reporting method. 21 4 Changing to the regular statutory reporting method
will cause the corporation to automatically forfeit the privilege of using a
special reporting method for subsequent years, unless the corporation timely
files a new petition and a substantial change in the nature of the corpora-
tion's business occurs. 2 15
IV. MISCELLANEOUS TAXES
In Hearing 17,140216 the comptroller strictly construed the Texas motor
vehicle tax to apply to the entire amount paid for a specially rigged truck.217
The taxpayer argued that the tax should not apply to the portion of the
purchase price attributable to labor costs for installing special equipment. 218
The taxpayer, however, did not have the equipment installed after taking
delivery of the truck; rather, the seller installed the equipment before the
taxpayer paid for and took possession of the truck. As a result the comptrol-
ler ruled that section 152.002 of the Tax Code 219 requires the motor vehicle
sales tax to be based upon the total consideration paid for the truck and all
costs of installing accessories. 220  Under rule 3.87221 a purchaser must
purchase and receive title to a vehicle prior to installation of accessories to
exclude the labor charges from the sales tax. Even in that event the sales
and use tax must be paid on the cost of the accessories themselves. 222
The legislature increased fuel taxes223 from $.10 per gallon to $.15 per
gallon 224 for the period from January 1, 1987, through August 31, 1987, and
also imposed a new dealer inventory tax on dealers of those fuels.225 New
section 153.016 of the Tax Code applies an inventory tax on dealers of gaso-
line and diesel fuel for increases in the tax rate, and such dealers will be
entitled to a refund upon any reduction in the tax rates.226 The comptroller
has amended rule 3.173227 to eliminate the requirement of submitting in-
214. Tex. Comp. Tax Rule No. 3.393 [1 Tex.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) T 14-011, at 995-98
(Mar. 5, 1986).
215. Id.
216. Comptroller Hearing No. 17,140 (1985).
217. Id.
218. The trucks, after being specially equipped, were used for servicing oil and gas pump-
ing units.
219. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 152.002 (Vernon 1982).
220. Comptroller Hearing No. 17,140 (1985).
221. Texas Comp. Tax Rule No. 3.87, [1 Tex.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 65-105, at 7223 (June
12, 1979).
222. Id.
223. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 153.102, 153.202, 153.210(b), 153.301(b), 153.305(e) and
151.416 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
224. Id. § 153.102 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
225. Id. § 153.016. The tax applies only to dealers with an inventory of 2,000 or more
gallons of fuel. As of January 1, 1987, any such dealer must report his inventory to the
comptroller and pay the additional tax of $.05 per gallon. Section 153.016 requires the comp-
troller to provide a method for claiming a refund if the tax rate is reduced. Id.
226. Id.




voices and other documentation with refund claims for gasoline and diesel
fuel taxes.
To reduce the hearing case load the comptroller adopted, on an emer-
gency basis, rule 3.5,228 which provides a special procedure for the settle-
ment of interest and penalties. The new rule provides that the taxpayer has
five days after the conclusion of an audit exit conference to make a written
request to the audit manager to settle amounts of penalty and interest.229
The audit manager has the authority to settle all amounts under $5000.23o
The audit manager is required to provide the taxpayer a written response to
the taxpayer's settlement office. 231 If no audit is performed, the taxpayer
files a written settlement request with the Tax Administration Division of
the comptroller's office. 232
228. Texas Comp. Tax Rule No. 3.5, [1 Tex.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 89-927, at 8989-90
(adopted on an emergency basis Mar. 3, 1986, adopted to be effective permanently beginning
July 1, 1986).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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